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COMMENTS
SEX DISCRIMNATION IN EMPLOYMENT
During the past six years, antifeminist employment practices have become a
focal point of governmental concern. In 1961, President Kennedy established
the President's Commission on the Status of Women,' and in 1963, Congress
enacted the Equal Pay Act2 in an attempt to secure for women compensation
commensurate to their work. That same year, the Civil Service Commission
established a policy of equal opportunity for both sexes in federal employment. 3
Under federal initiative, many state governors have set up commissions to plan
and effectuate the upgrading of women's social and civil status.4
Discrimination against women, while elusive to precise empirical analysis,
clearly decreases their opportunities for employment, equal pay and advancement. The majority of working women have been relegated to certain traditional categories of employment, such as teaching, nursing and clerical work.3
Governmental studies indicate that women attain consistently lower salary
scales than men, even when both engage in identical occupations.0 Subtler and
more frustrating are the barriers imposed on talented women seeking to develop
and advance in their chosen fields. The Committee on Private Employment of
the President's Commission on the Status of Women reported that "although
women in the work force have a somewhat higher-than-average schooling than
men, they, more generally than men, work in jobs far below their native abilities or trained capabilites." 7
Understandably, the President's Commission stressed the urgency of eliminating unfair restrictions in the employment of women. Women, for example,
represent one-third of the national labor force, or between twenty-four and
1. Exec. Order No. 10980, 26 Fed. Reg. 12059 (1961).
2. 77 Stat. 56 (1963), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1964).
3. 5 C.F.R. §§ 713.101-.102 (1964).
4. See Address by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Chairman Roosevelt,
National Council of Women's Conference on Women at Work, Oct. 12, 1965, in CCH
Employment Practices Guide U 8022, at 6034.
5. See President's Comm'n on the Status of Women, Report of the Committee on
Private Employment 44 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Private Employment].
6. See id. at 32-33. Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1060
(1938), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1964), by passing the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 77 Stat. 56, 29
U.S.C. § 206(d) (1964), in an attempt to remedy this injustice. The Committee on Protective Legislation of the President's Commission on the Status of Women noted, however,
that the Fair Labor Standards Act failed to cover about eleven million workers, about six
million of whom are women or approximately 257 of the total number of female workers.
President's Comm'n on the Status of Women, Report of the Committee on Protective Labor
Legislation 4 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Protective Legislation]. The Committee pointed
out, moreover, that the estimated percentages of women in certain notoriously low-paying
jobs are particularly high. For example, 50% of two and one-half million retail trade workers
are women unprotected by the Equal Pay Act. Ibid.
7. Private Employment 1.
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thirty million workers.8 The responsible heads of about ten per cent of all
American families are women, 9 and nearly half of these families subsist on an

annual income of less than three thousand dollars.' 0 While an estimated eighty

per cent of all American women at some time in their lives now actively com-

pete in the labor market," medical advances, changing standards of living,
and evolving social customs all predict an increasing participation by women

in the nation's economic life. 12

I. TITLE VII OF

THE CIL RIGHTs ACT OF

1964

A. Legislative History

During the debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1964,18 the House approved
an amendment to the original bill adding sex to the list of proscribed forms
of discrimination. The main supporters of this amendment were a group of
southern Representatives who seemed apprehensive of the supposedly prejudi-

cial tenor of the bill towards white women.' 4 Opponents of the amendment em-

phasized the need for comprehensive study of the limitless consequences of

such a provision.' 5 The impropriety of linking sex and racial discrimination

and thus jeopardizing the bill's primary objectives also influenced the opposi-

tion.Y6 Neither the House Committee on the Judiciary nor the House Com8. Id. at 30.

9. Id. at 31.
10. Women's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Women in Poverty 2 (1964).
11. See President's Comm'n on the Status of Women, American Women, Report and
Other Publications of the Commission 78-95 (Mead & Kaplan 1965) [hereinafter cited
as American Women].
12. Id. at 21.
13. 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-h (1964). Through a total of eleven titles, the Civil
Rights Act sought to insure the free exercise of rights in the areas of voting, public accommodations, education, publicly owned or operated facilities, federally financed projects
and employment. Title VII, dealing with employment, the longest and most complex In the
act, aimed at eradicating the form of discrimination most noxious to individuals and society.
See Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 Brooklyn
L. Rev. 62 (1964). See generally Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex
Discrimination and Title VII, 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 232 (1965); Note, 78 Harv. L. Rev.
684, 688-96 (1965) ; Note, 50 Iowa L. Rev. 778 (1965).
14. See 110 Cong. Rec. 2579, 2583 (1964). Representative Rivers of South Carolina
fairly summarized the arguments of nine southern colleagues by praising the amendment
for "making it possible for the white Christian woman to receive the same consitleration
for employment as the colored woman. It is incredible to me that the authors of this
monstrosity [the Civil Rights Act of 19641-whomever they are-would deprive the white
woman of mostly Anglo-Saxon or Christian heritage equal opportunity before the employer.
I know this Congress will not be a party to such an evil." Id. at 2583.
15. Representative Celler, chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary and a
leading supporter of the Civil Rights Bill, opposed the amendment on these grounds, id. at
2577-78, as did Representative Edith Green, who sponsored the Equal Pay Act. Id. at 2720.
16. See id. at 2581-82. Representative Green pointed out, moreover, that some who strongly
supported the sex amendment had opposed passage of the Equal Pay Act. Id. at 2591. In
addition, ten southern representatives who spoke in favor of the sex amendment eventually
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mittee on Education and Labor heard testimony regarding the sex amendment.17
No member of the House approached either committee to offer such a provision,
nor did any civic or governmental organization petition the Congress to enact
such legislation. 18 In fact, the President's Commission on the Status of '"'omen,
in rejecting a suggestion of its Committee on Civil and Political Rights, not
only declined to recommend such congressional action but termed legislation
of broad application and enforcement unrealistic.' 9 The legislative history of
the sex amendment reveals no clear congressional purpose or intent. Rather,
it indicates dubious motivation, lack of intelligent study, and absence of
20
direction.
B. Provisions
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 includes a blanket prohibition of
discrimination based on sex, which now renders it:
an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex . . .

(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive

or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities ...
individual's . . . sex ....

because of such

21

To this sweeping prohibition title VII adds but one exception: those situations
where sex is a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise. . . ."2 To implement its basic purposes, title VII created an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).2- This Commission, however, lacks remedial auvoted against the full Civil Rights Bill: Smith, who proposed the amendment, Dowdy,

Tuten, Pool, Andrews, Rivers, Huddleston, Gary, Watson and Gathings. Id. at 2804-05.
Apparently, the sex amendment owed its introduction and support less to a chivalrous concern for the rights of women than to general animosity to the Civil Rights Bill. Representative Green charged flatly that the supporters of the amendment were "openly and
honestly seeking to kill the entire bill." Id. at 2720.
17. Id. at 2582.
18. Ibid.
19. American Women 119.
20. An editorial from the New York Herald Tribune for February 10, 1964, which
Representative looney entered into the Congressional Record, characterized the legislative history of the sex amendment as follows: "The goal of the clause is worthy. It came, however, as an unplanned byproduct of a confused debate, in which the implications could
not be studied with the care they deserved. The issue was raised for mischievous reasons,
and it may well have unhappy effects." 110 Cong. Rec. 2706 (1964).
21. Civil Rights Act § 703(a), 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964). Section
701(b) defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who
has twenty-five or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks" in the calendar year. 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1964).
22. Civil Rights Act § 703(e)(1), 78 Stat. 256, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1964).
23. Civil Rights Act § 705(a), 78 Stat. 258, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (1964).

506
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thority and may neither
make determinations of unlawful conduct nor issue
24
cease-and-desist orders.
The EEOC is authorized to receive complaints from aggrieved parties, to
investigate charges of discrimination and to attempt the settlement of valid
complaints through the informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion.25 Title VII, however, does not authorize the EEOC to initiate litigation, so the burden of enforcement lies upon aggrieved individuals. A party
who believes himself the victim of unlawful discrimination may sue in a federal
district court, after initial recourse to the EEOC for informal relief,20 even
if the Commission determines the complaint to be without merit and refuses to
attempt conciliation.2 7 A court, upon finding that an employer intentionally
engaged in unlawful discrimination, may order appropriate relief, including
reinstatement or hiring, with or without back pay. 28 In processing complaints,

the EEOC must defer to existing state fair-employment agencies which enjoy
powers of enforcement. 29 Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination is apparently meant to operate, therefore, only in jurisdictions lacking effective
legislation.3"
C. Problems of Interpretation
While concededly laudable in purpose, title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination is replete with difficulties. In the first place, the bare language of
the statute sheds little light on the practicalities of its enforcement. The conspicuous absence of legislative history reveals no clear congressional intent.
No prior decisional or statutory law exists to provide interpretative guidelines.
And finally, conflict between title VII and state protective labor legislation
seems unavoidable. 3'
24. See Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
25. Civil Rights Act § 706(a), 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1964).
26. See Hall v. Werthan Bag. Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 187-88 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
27. See ibid. The Werthan Bag case held, moreover, that an aggrieved party might
intervene in a class action brought by a fellow employee for injunctive relief against an
employer allegedly practicing racial discrimination, even though the plaintiff had not
exhausted the EEOC remedies. The court declared that the purpose of requiring preliminary
resort to the Commission remedies is not to screen frivolous complaints from the courts
but to "give a discriminator opportunity to respond to persuasion rather than coercion ...."
Id. at 188. The right of an aggrieved party to bring an action under title VII is apparently
not contingent upon an EEOC finding of discrimination. See 110 Cong. Rec. 14191 (1964)
(remarks of Senator Javits).
The Attorney General has standing to bring an action whenever he has'reasonable cause
to believe that any person or group is engaging in a pattern of discrimination or a practice
of resistance to title VII. Civil Rights Act § 707(a), 78 Stat. 261, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a)
(1964). The EEOC has standing to sue under title VII only to compel compliance with a
court order already issued in a civil action. Civil Rights Act § 706(a), 78 Stat. 261, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(i) (1964).
28. Civil Rights Act § 706(g), 78 Stat. 261, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964).
29. Civil Rights Act § 706(b), 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1964).
30. Civil Rights Act § 1104, 78 Stat. 268, 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1964) ; 110 Cong. Rec.
1521 (1964) (remarks of Representative Celler).
31. See Address by EEOC Chairman Roosevelt, Governors' Commission on the Status

1967]

SEX DISCRIMINATION
II. TnE WORKINGS oF TITLE VII
A. Discrimination by Sex under Prior Law

The United States Constitution, except for the nineteenth amendment's
guarantee of the franchise, fails specifically to derogate the status of legal

nonentity allotted to women by the common law.32 The Constitution does not

explicitly provide a right of equal opportunity for both sexes.33 The Supreme

Court has never declared employment discrimination based on sex to be unconstitutional. The Court, on the other hand, has consistently upheld the

constitutionality of state legislation restricting the labor of women, even though
such legislation did not apply equally to men. 34

Protective labor legislation first appeared around the turn of the century
when abusive employment practices resulting from the industrial revolution

stirred the nation's humanitarian concern. 35 These labor statutes, which regulate terms and conditions of employment, often apply to both men and women. 30

Frequently, however, these statutes regulate the labor of women only and
are thereby vulnerable to attack under the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme
Court has held that protective labor legislation applying only to women

does not violate the fourteenth amendment's rights of due process and equal
protection.
In 1908, in the leading case of Miller v. Oregon,37 the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of an Oregon statute prohibiting work by women in

factories, laundries and other industrial establishments more than ten hours
of Women, Aug. 27, 1965, in CCH Employment Practices Guide ff 8005, at 6010-I1,
which outlined these problems. Mr. Roosevelt also noted the EEOC's task of harmonizing
the so-called Bennett amendment to title VII, Civil Rights Act § 703(h), 78 Stat. 257,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964), with the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 77 Stat. 56, 29 U-S.C.
§ 206(d) (1964). The Bennett amendment purports to allow differentiation by sex in compensation whenever such differentiation is authorized by the Equal Pay Act. The Equal
Pay Act, however, does not authorize wage differentials based on sex but merely lists
exceptions to the prohibition of discrimination where the factors determinative of the
wage rate are other than sex. 77 Stat. 56 (1963), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1) (1964). To avoid
conflict, the EEOC has ruled that the standard of equal pay for equal work prescribed by the
Equal Pay Act applies to the interpretation of title VII and that employees not covered by
the Equal Pay Act but within the coverage of title VII are thereby insured the right to
equal pay. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7(a) (1966). The EEOC has also indicated its intent to adopt
and apply relevant interpretations of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor to equal pay complaints filed under title VII. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.7(b)-(c) (1966).
32. See generally Crozier, Constitutionality of Discrimination Based on Sex, 15 B.U.L.
Rev. 723 (1935).
33. See note 105 infra.
34. See American Women 128; Murray & Eastwood, supra note 13, at 237.
35. See American Women 128-30.
36. See generally Brown, Police Power-Legislation for Health and Personal Safety,
42 Harv. L. Rev. 866, 883-88 (1929).
37. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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in any one day. Declaring that it took "judicial cognizance" of such "matters
of general knowledge" 38 as women's inferior capacity in the struggle for subsistence resulting from her delicate physical structure and performance of
maternal functions,39 the Court reasoned that the maternal and familial functions of women, together with their unequal bargaining position in the labor
market, provide rational bases for discriminating
between the sexes in the
40
incidence of protective labor legislation.
A considerable number of Supreme Court decisions have followed the doctrine
of Muller v. Oregon.4 1 In Quong Wing v. Kirkendall,42 the Court emphasized
that the fourteenth amendment does not create "a fictitious equality where
there is a real difference" between the sexes. 48 Unequal application of protective labor legislation, the Court pointed out in Radice v. New York, 44 encounters the challenge of the equal protection clause only when "'actually and palpably unreasonable and arbitrary.' -4r As recently as 1948 the Supreme Court, in
Goesaert v. Cleary,46 upheld the constitutionality of a state law prohibiting the
licensing of women bartenders unless they be the wife or daughter of the establishment's owner. After declaring that the fourteenth amendment disallows
discrimination by sex only where such discrimination is without basis in reason,
the Court held that the disputed statute entailed no "irrational discrimination"
despite its unequal application even among women. 47 Though state law may
reasonably restrict the employment of women in the sale of alcoholic beverages,
wives and daughters of tavern owners, the Court surmised,
faced lesser perils
48
from the traffic of liquor than their unprotected coworkers.
38.

Id. at 421.

39. Ibid.
40. Id. at 422-23.
41. E.g., Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915) (8 hour day for female hospital
employees); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915) (8 hour day for chambermaids); Riley
v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914) (56 hour week for women).
42. 223 U.S. 59 (1912).
43. Id. at 63.
44. 264 U.S. 292 (1924).
45. Id. at 296, quoting from Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 261
U.S. 379, 384 (1923).
46. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
47. Id. at 466.
48. Id. at 466-67.
In his dissent to Goesaert, Mr. Justice Rutledge stated that the controverted statute
envisaged a classification which was invidious. Id. at 468. While noting that the equal
protection clause demands neither "'abstract symmetry'" nor "'mathematical nicety,'"
Mr. Justice Rutledge pointed out that under the proposed statute wives or daughters of
an owner might be licensed as bartenders, though the owner remain always absent from
the premises. A woman not so related to the owner, on the other hand, would be denied
a license, though male supervision be always on hand. Id. at 467-68 (dissenting opinion).
During the House debate on title VII, the Goesaert opinion met sharp criticism from
Representative Martha Griffiths, who termed it "the most vulgar and insulting of decisions
handed down in this century by the Supreme Court, notable for its lack of legal learning
as well as for its arrogant prejudice . . . ." 110 Cong. Rec. 2580 (1964). In particular, Rep-

1967]

SEX DISCRIMINATION

Since the Muller v. Oregon49 decision, protective labor legislation for women
has attained considerable volume and extent. Today, some form of such legislation appears on the books of all fifty states and the District of Columbia.*
Most commonly, these statutes prescribe the maximum hours during which
women may be employed daily and weekly. 51 Other provisions establish minimum wages for female workers5 2 or prohibit certain hazardous and strenuous
forms of work. 53 In certain instances, these statutes require separate facilities
for women 54 or provide maternity or special health benefits.,, Such protective
legislation, though beneficially intended, contains dear discriminatory potential.
An employer, for example, faced with both a male and a female applicant for
the identical position and aware of the higher labor standards legally applicable
to women, might understandably disregard an imbalance in merit or capacity
and hire the less-qualified male.
B. Discriminationunder Title VII

1. The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
The fate of title VH's prohibition of sex discrimination hinges on interpretation of the "bona fide occupational qualification." An unduly liberal construction of this exception would nullify the amendment altogether. Too rigid an
interpretation, on the other hand, might entail an "uncritical and unintended
application of the principle of equality of the sexes in employment."5 0
While title VII plainly dictates the elimination of arbitrary discrimination
between the sexes in employment practices, its practical application appears
problematic. It threatens to disrupt policies established by tradition or required
by state legislation or collective bargaining agreements. 57 Common sense and
sympathetic understanding of the position and needs of women workers must
resentative Griffiths questioned the sense of legal realism which led the majority to declare
that "'the Constitution does not require a legislature to reflect sociological insight or
shifting social standards any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest
scientific standards.'" 110 Cong. Rec. 2580 (1964), quoting from Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 US.
464, 466 (1948).
49. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
50. See Women's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Labor Laws Affecting Women (1966).
51. E.g., Cal. Labor Code Ann. § 1351 (8 hour day); N.Y. Lab. Law § 172 (48 hour
week).
52. E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-613 (1960) ($1.25 per day).
53. E.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 293.060 (1965) (prohibiting female miners).
54. E.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 292.150 (1965) (wash rooms for women).
55. E.g., R. L Gen. Laws Ann. § 28-41-8 (Supp. 1965) (unemployment benefits before
and after childbirth).
56. Berg, supra note 13, at 72.
57. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.1-.7 (1966); General Counsel of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n, Opinion Letter, Aug. 23, 1966, in CCH Employment Practices
Guide ff 17304.03, at 7410 (collective bargaining agreement guaranteeing longer work
week for males); General Counsel of the Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Opinion
Letter, Aug. 23, 1966, in CCH Employment Practices Guide U 17304.09, at 7410 (collective bargaining agreement prohibiting female bartenders).
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therefore guide interpretation of this statute. Though devoid of quasi-legislative
power over substantive rights and obligations, the EEOC has authority to
issue procedural regulations to assist the implementation of title VII.68 Under
title VII, moreover, good faith reliance on a formal EEOC interpretation or
opinion constitutes a defense to a charge of unlawful discrimination. 0 An
examination of the current EEOC rulings may, therefore, prove illuminative.
The bona fide occupational qualification clause, in the opinion of the EEOC,
should receive narrow construction according to the rule normally applied to
statutory exceptions.60 Although the EEOC has avoided the enumeration of
positive conditions under which sex becomes a legitimate occupational qualification, it has listed certain factors which, in its opinion, fail to constitute
acceptable grounds for claiming the exception. Under these rulings the following
reasons for discriminating between the sexes in employment policies are invalid:
the necessity of supplying separate facilities, 6' assumptions of the comparative
employment characteristics of the sexes, 62 stereotyped characterizations and
general attributes of the sexes,6 and preferences of employers, coworkers or
clients.6 4 Thus, a refusal to hire a woman on the general assumption that the
incidence of turnover among female workers exceeds the male rate would constitute an unlawful employment practice under the EEOC guidelines. Likewise, failure to employ women in marketing positions in the belief that they are
less capable than men of aggressive salesmanship would be unlawfully discriminatory because it is based on a "stereotyped characterization." The present
EEOC rulings do, however, indicate that the requirements of authenticity or
genuineness may provide acceptable bases for asserting sex as a bona fide occupational qualification. 65 Sex will, for example, be a legitimate occupational
qualification for a clothes model or a theatrical player.
The EEOC has itself recognized that "an overly literal interpretation of
the prohibition [of sex discrimination] might disrupt longstanding employment
practices... without achieving compensating benefits in progress towards equal
opportunity.1 66 However, the EEOC's declared intent to allow the bona fide
occupational qualification only narrow construction, and its present rulings,
which apparently allow sex as an occupational qualification only in cases of
strict necessity, portend a rigid application of title VII. A test case now
pending before the EEOC illustrates the problems involved. A complainant-union
charges that the practice of certain airlines in hiring exclusively female flight
attendants violates title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination. 7 Neither strict
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Civil Rights Act § 713(a), 78 Stat. 265, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1964).
Civil Rights Act § 713(b), 78 Stat. 265, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1964).
29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a) (1966).
29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a)(1)(iv) (1966).
29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a)(1)(i) (1966).
29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a)(1)(ii) (1966).
29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a)(1)(iii) (1966).
29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a) (2) (1966).
30 Fed. Reg. 14926, 14927 (1965).
CCH Employment Practices Guide, 20 Report Letter 4 (May 20, 1966).
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necessity nor wholly arbitrary or irrational discrimination motivate this exclusive hiring policy. None of the duties of a flight attendant are beyond
male capacities, yet the understandable belief that feminine pulchritude and
charm are invaluable assets in the attraction and service of passengers undoubtedly dictates this hiring practice. 68 The current EEOC guidelines, however, would apparently condemn such a personnel policy on the grounds that
general sex attributes and preferences of customers are inappropriate bases
for a bona fide occupational qualification. On the other hand, if an airline is
entitled to offer a certain atmosphere to its passengers as a legitimately ancillary
service, 69 a contention that the hiring of female flight attendants is reasonably
necessary to normal business operations might not be wholly untenable. 70
The stewardess case illustrates the subtleties involved in defining the limits
of a bona fide occupational qualification based on sex in situations where
differentiation by sex is neither necessary nor arbitrary but, in varying degrees,
reasonable. Clearly, definition of those limits must follow a course of case by
case determination, as the EEOC has recognized. 71
Discrimination against women in the selection of executive trainees presents
a crucial problem in the application and enforcement of title VII. Industry
would apparently contend that women of marriageable age represent a far
greater turnover risk than men and that the inclusion of women in executive
training programs, which are maintained at considerable expense, involves
an unreasonable risk of lost investment.7 2 Sound investment in executive
training, industry might argue, is "reasonably necessary" to the normal functioning of any large business, and sex is, therefore, a bona fide occupational qualification of executive trainees. The EEOC, through its chairman, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Jr., has declared an uncompromising position against this form of
discrimination against women on the ground that it initiates discrimination
68. See ibid.
69. Cf. Policy Statement of the Washington State Board Against Discrimination, Nov.

18, 1965, in CCH Employment Practices Guide f 8034, at 6056, in which an employer's
requirement that cocktail waitresses be "sexy and exciting" was held not to violate a state
statute that prohibited age discrimination. Owners of cocktail lounges, the Board reasoned,
are entitled to offer the public atmosphere in addition to food and alcoholic beverages.
Since "atmosphere" may include the sex appeal of waitresses, the Board concluded that
legitimate business reasons required that waitresses should meet certain standards of
physical attractiveness. Although older women as a class might find these conditions
difficult to meet, the owners' requirement was held to be not strictly an age requirement
but a nondiscriminatory occupational qualification.
70. But cf. Airlines Indus., CCH Employment Practices Guide I 8051, at 6079 (N.Y.
Human Relations Comm'n, March 23, 1965). The Commission ruled that a mandatory
retirement age for airline stewardesses should be predicated solely on the individual's
continued ability to perform the required duties of the position.
71. See Address by EEOC Chairman Roosevelt, National Council of Women's Conference on Women at Work, Oct. 12, 1965, in CCH Employment Practices Guide U 8022,
at 6033.
72.

Ibid.
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which will continue throughout their careers since top executives are usually
selected from these training programs. 73
Thus, in a situation where industry argues a reasonable necessity for sex
discrimination, women rightfully demand equal opportunity under title VII.
The abstract guidelines announced by the EEOC, it is submitted, cannot
forecast the solution of such a dilemma as satisfactorily as a pragmatic
attempt to balance the interests of industry with the concrete needs and
position of women workers. In a specific case, therefore, an employer asserting
sex as a bona fide occupational qualification for an executive training program
should be required to demonstrate that acceptance of a particular, qualified
female candidate imposes a risk of investment loss sufficiently onerous to
74
justify the exception to title V1I.
One test proposed as a guide in interpreting the bona fide occupational
qualification is the standard of reasonable discrimination applied to protective
legislation for women to determine its validity under the equal protection
clause. 75 By this criterion, an employer might legitimately assert an exception
to title VII whenever he could demonstrate some basis in reason for discriminating between the sexes. Applied to discrimination in executive training programs,
for example, this test might allow exclusion of women by a mere showing of
some risk of lost investment. The exception might be denied, moreover, only
where discrimination by sex involves "irrational discrimination" as prohibited
by the fourteenth amendment. 76 Such an approach, however, seems adverse to
the spirit of title VII. The wide abstractions of the fourteenth amendment,
moreover, provide entirely too amorphous a test 77 to solve the complex problems of employment discrimination based on sex.
73. Ibid. The President's Commission also deplores the existence of this form of discrimination. Private Employment 39.
74. To require a particular employer to show that acceptance of an individual female
represents a risk of investment loss sufficient to excuse compliance with title VII may seem
stringent. A woman charging discrimination in the selection of executive trainees, however, might well be under an insurmountable burden. To obtain equitable relief under
title VII an aggrieved party must show that an employer "intentionally engaged" in unlawful discrimination. Civil Rights Act § 706(g), 78 Stat. 261, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(1964). In view of the uniformly high qualifications of candidates and the subtleties of
selection involved in such training programs, proof of intentional sex discrimination might
be virtually impossible. Admission of statistical evidence of discrimination might, however,
mollify a plaintiff's task. But see Civil Rights Act § 703(j), 78 Stat. 257, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2() (1964), which states that no employer shall be required to grant any individual
or group preferential treatment on account of an imbalance in the number or percentage
of employees of one sex already employed.
75. See Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
31 Brooklyn L. Rev. 62, 80 (1964).
76. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
77. See Brown, supra note 36, at 870.
Experience under state fair employment statutes sheds little light on the probable interpretation of the bona fide occupational exception. Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964
only Wisconsin prohibited sex discrimination in employment. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 11132(5)
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2. Conflict with Protective Labor Legislation

The EEOC, in the publication of its guidelines, noted the probability of
conflict between title VII and protective labor legislation for women.78 Under
its present guidelines, an employer may assert a bona fide occupational qualification whenever a state law prohibits women from engaging in a particular
form of work. 79 The Commission has stressed, however, that only statutes
that provide protection from hazards reasonably to be apprehended will qualify
for the exception ° and that no law whose clear effect is discriminatory rather
than protective will constitute a valid basis for the statutory exception.8
Moreover, the EEOC requires that an employer asserting a bona fide occupational qualification by reason of a protective statute shall have attempted, in
good faith, to obtain from the appropriate state agency such administrative
82
exceptions as might be available.
Critics of protective legislation for women have labeled it arbitrary and
unjust.8 3 Although the accusations leveled at these laws share varying degrees

of plausibility, sound reasons exist to indicate the advisability of reevaluating
(a) (Supp. 1966). The Wisconsin statute allows discrimination by sex only "where the
nature of the work or working conditions provide valid reasons for hiring only men or
women . . . ." Ws. Stat. Ann. § 111.32(5) (d) (Supp. 1966). The 'Wsconsin statute, then,
merely articulates, in different language, the same exception as does title VII.
Hawaii enacted a statute prohibiting sex discrimination almost simultaneously with
title VII. The Hawaii statute allows differentiation by sex only "for good cause relating
to the ability of the individual to perform the work in question . . . ." Hawaii Rev. Laws
§ 90A-1(a) (Supp. 1963). The Hawaii test apparently permits discrimination by sex only
out of strict necessity.
78. See, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 2580 (1964).
79. 29 C.F.R. § 16 04.1(c)(1) (1966).
80. Ibid.
81. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(c) (3) (1966). See also General Counsel of the Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Opinion Letter, in CCH Employment Practices Guide
F117304.07, at 7413-3.
82. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(c)(3) (1966).
83. Some have considered such legislation "perfectly adapted to the freeing of men
workers from the competition of women in the better paid and more attractive positions . . . ." Crozier, Constitutionality of Discrimination Based on Sex, 15 B.U.L. Rev.
723, 753 (1935). Others say such legislation "prevents women from going into the higher
salary brackets." 110 Cong. Rec. 2580 (1964) (remarks of Representative Katherine St.
George). The protective attitude behind such laws has, according to some, "penalized all
women for the biological function of motherhood far in excess of precautions justified by
the findings of advanced medical science." Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law:
Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 232, 239-40 (1965).
The Committee on Protective Legislation of the President's Commission, however, found
the record of these protective statutes impressive and attributed to them partial responsibility for the advances made in employment opportunities for women. During the past
fifty years, for example, the average real wages of working women have more than
doubled, increasing at about a 10% faster rate than the earnings of men. Protective Legislation 1-2.
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them. Provisions once adopted for valid protective reasons may now be obsolete
in a technological economy which continually expands the role of the female
worker. 84 Hence, the practical effect of such outmoded laws may be "not so
much to protect as to disadvantage." 85'
Already, the EEOC has received a volume of complaints charging unlawful
discrimination under these protective labor statutes. The complainant in one
such case charged a discriminatory denial of opportunities for premium overtime pay. The respondent-employer claimed justification under a provision
of the California Labor Code which prohibits women from working in excess
of eight hours daily or forty-eight hours weekly. 86 No finding appeared, moreover, that overtime work posed any threat to the complainant's well-being. 87
The case appears to present the conflict between title VII and protective labor
legislation for women in total and unresolvable form. Accordingly, the EEOC
has issued a special advisement declaring its intent, upon recurrence of this
conflict, to advise complainants to sue in federal court to obtain a judicial determination of the disputed state law's validity in light of title VII. 88
In Reynolds v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,89 the Arizona Civil Rights
Commission issued an opinion declaring that protective legislation which conflicts with title VII's spirit of equality of opportunity should yield to the
federal law." The complainant in the Reynolds case applied for the position
of plant dispatcher, which had a higher wage rate than her position as a plant
reports clerk. The employer-respondent admitted the complainant's qualifications
for the position but defended its refusal to consider her on the grounds of a
statute prohibiting the employment of women in excess of eight hours daily or
forty-eight hours weekly 9 1 The employer granted, moreover, that the complainant could work the required extra hours without danger to her health
or welfare. On these facts, the Arizona Civil Rights Commission found that
the protective statute discriminates against women on the basis of their sex
02
and that the respondent had violated the newly enacted state Civil Rights Act.
Thus, title VII may supersede much of the present labor legislation for women
that is discriminatory rather than protective.0 8 The advent of suits challenging
84. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(b) (1966).
85. 30 Fed. Reg. 14927 (1965).
86. Cal. Labor Code Ann. § 1351.
87. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Processing of Cases Involving State Protective Laws, Aug. 19, 1966, in CCH Employment Practices Guide ff 16903, at 7317.
88. Id. at 7318.
89. CCH Employment Practices Guide 9 8111, at 6183 (Ariz. Civil Rights Comm'n
Dec. 2, 1966).
90. Id. at 6184-85.
91. Id. at 6183.
92. Id. at 6185.
93. Section 708 of the Civil Rights Act provides that "nothing in this subchapter
shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any liability . . . provided by any
...

law of any State . . . other than any such law which purports to requiro or permit

the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter." 78 Stat. 262, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1964). But see, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 296.020(8)
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the validity of state protective laws under title VII, it has been suggested, may
also initiate relitigation of the constitutionality of discrimination by sex in the
incidence of protective labor legislation.94 To predict Supreme Court declaration of the unconstitutionality of protective labor legislation for women, however, contradicts established precedent. The constitutional requirements of
equal protection do not require the legislative authority to extend its regulation
to all possible cases, unless the unequal application of a particular statute
Application of a maximum hours
constitutes an arbitrary discrimination.
law to Negro women but not to white women, for example, would arbitrarily
discriminate because racial difference is not a reasonable basis for unequal
application of such a protective measure. The performance of maternal and
familial functions, the Supreme Court has frequently held, provides a reasonable
basis for differentiation between the sexes in the application of protective legislation.96 Although some of these laws may suffer from the defect of outmoded
utility, the possibility that superior protective measures might be devised
would not necessarily render a particular statute unconstitutional.9T Should
title VII be held generally to supersede protective statutes for women, relitigation of their constitutionality, moreover, would become superfluous.
The possibility that protective labor legislation applicable solely to women
may be struck down is not, however, wholly remote. In many instances, the
rational relationship between such legislation and the actual protection of
maternal and familial functions appears tenuous. 8 The Supreme Court's
facile assumption in Muller v. Oregon99 of the inferior capacities of women 00
and its curt dismissal of "sociological insight" and "shifting social standards"
102
in Goesaert v. Cleary 01 may become less persuasive with the passage of time.
(Supp. 1966), which provides that the Missouri fair employment act does not supersede other

state laws which permit or require differentiation by sex. In Maryland, the Attorney General
has ruled that title VII does not supersede a state law prescribing maximum hours for
women because it envisaged no arbitrary or invidious discriminations as prohibited by
the fourteenth amendment. Opinion of the Att'y Gen. of Maryland, Jan. 19, 1966, in CCH
Employment Practices Guide ff 8044, at 6068. See also Opinion of the Att'y Gen. of Wyoming, No. 43, Sept. 14, 1965, in CCH Employment Practices Guide U 8030, at 6048. But
see Reynolds v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., CCH Employment Practices Guide
fI 8111, at 6183 (Ariz. Civil Rights Comm'n Dec. 2, 1966).
94. Murray & Eastwood, supra note 83, at 241-42. But see Sarfaty v. Nowak, 369 F.2d
256 (7th Cir. 1966).
95. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
96. See notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text.
97. CL Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 152 (1963);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
98. See Murray & Eastwood, supra note 83, at 238-42.
99.

208 U.S. 412 (1908).

100. Id. at 421.
101.

335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948).

102. "The conditions which gave rise to the enactment of protective legislation for
women have now disappeared in large measure.... Mortality tables consistently showing

a greater life expectancy for females have led us to doubt our opinions about the frailties
of women." Reynolds v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., CCI: Employment Practices
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III. CONCLUSION
Despite its novelty and confused congressional history, the sex amendment

to title VII may yet prove a beneficial piece of legislation. 10 3 If so, the courts
must interpret the bona fide occupational qualification with reasonable flexibility.
This exigency, it is suggested, demands revision of the present EEOC guidelines
to allow reliance on such reasonable psychological factors as general sex attributes and client preferences in the determination of personnel policy where
differentiation by sex is neither arbitrary nor oppressive. Finally, suits chal-

lenging the validity of state laws under title VII may spur legislative action
to upgrade and standardize protective labor legislation' 0 4 and may even terminate in a Supreme Court statement of the principle of equality of opportunity
for both sexes. 0 5
Guide ff 8111, at 6184 (Ariz. Civil Rights Comm'n Dec. 2, 1966). See also People v.
Gardner, CCH Employment Practices Guide f1 9015, at 6567 (Los Angeles Munic. Ct.
Feb. 23, 1966).
103. In its first report to the President on the first hundred days of activity, the EEOC
noted that about 15% of the total number of complaints received involved charges of sex
discrimination, though comparatively few cases concerned complaints by members of one
sex aspiring to jobs traditionally held by members of the other. The Commission stressed
that implementation of the prohibition of sex discrimination represented a particularly
challenging assignment, and that the task of translating the generalities of the statute
into comprehensive and comprehensible standards has occupied a significant portion of
its time and energy. EEOC Report, Oct. 9, 1966, in CCH Employment Practices Guide
ff 8024, at 6034.
104. Protective Legislation 22-26. The Committee pointed out, for example, that certain
state laws prohibiting women from lifting objects over a specified maximum weight were
unrealistic. Id. at 17. See, e.g., Cal. Labor Code Ann. §§ 1251-52 (50 pound lifting maximum,
10 pound carrying maximum); Industrial Comm'n of Utah, Welfare Regulations for Any
Occupation, 2 CCH Lab. L. Rep. 45525, at 58942 (1966) (30 pound lifting maximum, 15
pound carrying maximum). The EEOC has ruled that "restrictions on lifting weights will
not be deemed in conflict with Title VII except where the limit is set at an unreasonably
low level which could not endanger women." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(c) (1966). The Committee
on Protective Labor Legislation recommended that because of the many variable factors
involved, such as individual strength and physical condition, the level, frequency and
method of lifting and the compactness of the load, the regulation of weightlifting by both
sexes "be carried out by appropriate and adequately authorized and financed regulatory
bodies, rather than through specific laws . . . ." Protective Legislation 17.
105. A constitutional amendment providing that "'equality of rights under the law
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex'"
has been introduced in each Congress since 1932. American Women 147. The amendment,
H.R.J. Res. 63, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1967), was introduced on Jan. 12, 1967 by Representative Kupferman. See 113 Cong. Rec. H136 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1967). The Senate approved
such an amendment in 1950 after adding the so-called "Hayden rider." 96 Cong. Rec. 870-72
(1950). The "Hayden rider" provided that the amendment should "not be construed to
impair any rights, benefits, or exemptions . . . conferred by law upon persons of the female
sex." Id. at 870. Congress's reluctancy to disturb protective legislation for women is perhaps
indicative of its intent that such laws not be superseded by title VII. See 110 Cong. Rec.
2578, 2582 (1964) (remarks of Representative Thompson); 106 Cong. Rec. 15679-80 (1960)
(remarks of Senator Hayden).

